Or even better foles starts to light it up and we get bpa with that pick
I was really thinking about this offense...Charley Casserly even said Teddy Bridgewater is better than Fole?!? Shit....But a buddy I know as HB directed me to this site, to read something....
http://www.footballoutsiders.com/extra-points/2015/understanding-broncos-offense
which sent me to a Broncos page:
http://www.milehighreport.com/2015/10/23/9602160/broncos-offense-2015-peyton-manning-explainer
and it got me to thinking...I've been banging on Foles...every post...esp. after that game against Green Bay...
It seems I may have been a little premature....sorta like my Latin comment...tavon's Spanish comment...The WCO is a blend of understandings...between wr & QB....and their interpretation of reads...It's why Sam wasn't the same Sam in 2012 that he was in 2013...His understanding...and the receivers were not meshing...and you could see the difference...
When will the switch turn on? When will he light it up? I suspect soon...no, not Sunday...but hopefully...But he needs his receivers to as well....Check Fishers comments from today's presser:
(On what he saw out of TE Jared Cook last weekend and what he expects out of him every week)
"Yeah, Jared bounced back and he’s always going to do that. I’ve known him for a long time. The position’s hard. Sometimes balls come loose. Sometimes you don’t make the catches. But, he bounced back and made some really good catches for us. Each week, (QB) Nick (Foles) and Jared and (WR) Brian (Quick) and the rest of the guys are becoming more and more familiar with each other. So, you would hope that in a game like this, where they’re going to be geared and focused on stopping our run, that Jared would have some big plays."
He's basically trying to say, "patience Champ" as the guys get on the same page....Cig is getting there...the proof is the Tavon development and the use of Gurley...and the integration of a very young o-line....all by Cig:
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap30...tavon-austin-being-maximized-by-st-louis-rams
Todd Gurley, Tavon Austin being maximized by St. Louis Rams
The
St. Louis Rams have quietly emerged as legitimate contenders in the NFC behind an offense that's creating headaches for defensive coordinators everywhere, led by rookie back
Todd Gurley and young receiver
Tavon Austin. Considering this attack has helped the
Rams carry a winning record into Week 9 for the first time since the 2006 season, I thought I would break down the
All-22 Coaches Film, to see how St. Louis is getting it done. Here's what I discovered:
1) Todd Gurley has shown himself to be the Rams' franchise player.
In the scouting world, the term "franchise player" is reserved for playmakers with the kind of transcendent talent that places them among the top five at their respective positions. Thus, I'm paying the 6-foot-1, 227-pound rookie the highest compliment in the book when I describe him as the premier player on the
Rams' roster just five games into his career.
I know most teams refer to their quarterback as their "franchise player," but the
Rams' offense is driven by Gurley's spectacular talents as an electric runner with an uncommon combination of size, speed, power and agility. Not only has he reeled off four straight 100-yard games, but his 566 rushing yards in his first four career starts are the most of any NFL player since 1991.
Most scouts expected Gurley to take the NFL by storm when they watched him blow through the SEC for almost three seasons prior to suffering a season-ending knee injury last year. But few expected him to bounce back from that injury this quickly, or immediately emerge as one of the top runners in the NFL. Gurley has not only met the expectations that accompanied his selection with the 10th overall pick in the 2015
NFL Draft, but he's lived up to the lofty comparisons (to
Marshawn Lynch and
Adrian Peterson, for example) that astute scouts have thrown out after watching his game.
From a scouting perspective, Gurley exhibits all of the traits the great ones possess as dynamic inside-outside runners. He is a ferocious runner between the tackles with extraordinary strength and power, as evidenced by his remarkable ability to run through contact in the hole. Additionally, Gurley displays exceptional balance, body control and agility slipping through creases at the point of attack. Although he is less than a year removed from the ACL injury, the rookie shows outstanding lateral quickness and burst making hard cuts in the hole. With Gurley also showing the burst and acceleration to turn the corner on outside runs, the
Rams can attack the defense with a diverse running game that probes the defense from various angles.
In the video clip to the right, from the
Rams'
Week 7 win over Cleveland, Gurley displays nearly all of his elite characteristics on one run. After taking a handoff on an inside zone play, Gurley slithers through a crease at the line and runs through an arm tackle before cutting the ball back to the back side. The combination of balance, body control and burst is a thing of beauty, and it's one of the reasons Gurley could emerge as the NFL's premier running back early in his career.
Gurley's big-play ability adds an explosive element to the
Rams' offense while allowing the unit to maintain the rough and rugged approach that Fisher covets in his squad. The
Rams are comfortable leaning on their workhorse runner to salt away leads in the fourth quarter, which is when defenders typically tire of hitting big-bodied, physical runners like Gurley. It's no coincidence Gurley has amassed 38.4 percent of his rushing yards (221 yards) in the fourth quarter. Most impressively, he's averaged 8.5 yards per carry in the fourth quarter.
One of the best running back prospects to enter the NFL since 2007 has given the
Rams' offense an identity. Gurley is a franchise player St. Louis can lean on during a playoff push.
2) Frank Cignetti has unlocked Tavon Austin's potential.
Credit the
Rams for promoting an offensive assistant with an extensive collegiate background to the offensive coordinator position. Having knowledge of and experience with high school and collegiate concepts has become a vital part of the offensive equation, due to the proliferation of the spread throughout college football. While most would associate the experience with schematics, I believe dealing with young, athletic playmakers as collegians provides savvy offensive coaches with an opportunity to tap into their collegiate playbook to create big-play opportunities for their most dynamic players.
Given Cignetti's recent experience on the collegiate level (he served as an offensive assistant at Fresno State and North Carolina), he understands how to get the ball to the ultra-explosive Austin in a variety of ways on the perimeter. From jet- and fly-sweeps to traditional handoffs to bubble screens, Cignetti is using a number of concepts plucked straight from the high school and college playbook to get the ball into the hands of the
Rams' most dangerous perimeter weapon in space. The concepts used are familiar to Austin from his experience at West Virginia --
and they taps into his skills as a dynamic runner.
It has thus not been surprising to see Austin make a significant impact for the
Rams this season, with the playbook featuring more quick-hitting plays designed to get him easy touches on the perimeter. Austin -- who is firmly established as one of the most dangerous kick returners in the game -- has explosive speed, quickness and cutback ability with the ball in his hands, and the
Rams are wise to prioritize him in their offense.
The
All-22 Coaches Film shows that Cignetti is incorporating more fly sweeps into the game plan to get Austin loose on the edges. In the play depicted below, from the
Rams'
Week 5 matchup with the
Green Bay Packers, the
Rams are aligned in a trix formation, with Austin positioned at WR3. Prior to the snap, Austin motions across the formation. Quarterback
Nick Foles flips the ball to Austin on a fly sweep to the left. Tight end
Jared Cook gets a great block on
Clay Matthews at the line, leaving a hole for Austin off-tackle. With tackle
Greg Robinson sealing off the interior with a crushing block on the linebacker, Austin scoots in for a 5-yard score
Against the
San Francisco 49ers in Week 8, the
Rams used a jet sweep to get Austin loose near the end zone. As you can see below, the team is aligned in a solo formation (Ace Slot), with Austin positioned in the slot. He motions across the formation prior to the snap and receives the handoff at full speed. Cook executes a reach block on the defender at the end of the line, allowing Austin to race into the end zone for a 2-yard score on another play plucked from a high school playbook
In the play depicted below, from the win over the Niners, the
Rams get the ball to Austin on a quick screen to take advantage of his running skills in space. The team aligns in a dubs formation, with Austin stacked behind receiver
Kenny Britt. Foles executes a quick fake to
Benny Cunningham before wheeling around to fire a dart to Austin on the screen. Robinson and
Tim Barnes race out front to lead the way on the screen. Austin snags the pass, weaves through traffic and reaches the end zone on a simple quick screen to the perimeter
The
Rams have opened up the playbook to help their diminutive playmaker get more opportunities on the perimeter, and the results have been spectacular. Through seven games, Austin has accounted for seven touchdowns (four receiving, two rushing and one punt return). Given Austin's impact as a multipurpose weapon, Cignetti deserves praise for digging a little deeper into the playbook to get his most explosive playmaker more touches in the open field.
3) Cignetti's creative scheming has helped the young O-line blossom.
Cignetti deserves credit not only for creating big-play opportunities for the
Rams' top perimeter weapons, but for using a creative scheme to help his young offensive line dominate in the trenches.
The success of the
Rams'
third-ranked rushing offense has been fueled by a move to a zone-based scheme that better suits the team's athletic offensive line. The unit features a pair of rookies (
Rob Havenstein and
Jamon Brown) and a second-year pro (Robinson) with the collective size, strength and agility to latch onto defenders on the move. The scheme is commonly used on the collegiate level due to the popularity of the zone-read by proponents of the spread, which eases the transition for youngsters adapting to the pro game. Additionally, the scheme allows blockers to work to assigned areas (offensive linemen are instructed to latch onto defenders on their assigned tracks) instead of matching up with designated defenders at the line. Thus, the unit is able to work in concert to create seams at the point of attack, resulting in fewer negative plays and facilitating consistent production from disciplined runners.
While the move to a zone-based scheme is definitely not earth-shattering in the NFL world, the creative enhancements Cignetti has added to the running game have helped the
Rams' blockers get better angles on their assigned defenders and create bigger seams for runners. One such element is the utilization of the fake reverse or end around. During my time with the
Oakland Raiders in the late 1990s, I watched Jon Gruden use the fake reverse to control the backside defensive end or linebacker on inside runs (backside edge players are responsible for bootleg, cutback and reverse). Cignetti is using the tactic to keep defenders from chasing runners from the back side. The collegiate version of the zone-read system providing similar controls, and Cignetti has tapped into a system that is familiar to the
Rams' young blockers and runners alike.
In the
Rams'
Week 4 matchup against the
Cardinals, the outside zone-fake reverse produced a huge gain for Gurley in the fourth quarter, as you can see below. The
Rams are aligned in an offset I-formation, with Gurley at tailback. Austin is positioned at split end (X) and instructed to run a fake reverse to the right. Foles hands the ball to Gurley and executes a fake to Austin. The fake forces the
Cardinals' backside defenders to pause for a count before pursuing Gurley. The hesitation provides the offensive tackle (Havenstein) with just enough time to get to the
Cardinals'
Deone Bucannon and give Gurley the crease he needs to reach the second level. The rookie eventually rumbles 52 yards
The
Rams used a similar tactics against the
49ers to hold the backside safety on inside runs. On the play depicted below, the
Rams are aligned in a trips bunch formation, with Austin positioned at WR1. He will fake a reverse to the left while Gurley executes an inside zone. The reverse fake by Austin holds the strong safety (
Eric Reid) for a count, allowing Gurley to burst through a seam on the back side. Although this play only netted 8 yards, it showcases the impact of the misdirection action on the defense
With the
Rams also using fake jet- and fly-sweep action to hold backside defenders and create lanes for their star runner between the tackles, defensive coordinators will need to devote extra practice time to defending ghost tactics.
What I'm gathering is that the offense is building into something...It has to, right? There is no way Fish wanted to be last...Maybe middle of the pack, but definitely not last....The development of Quick is what had me particularly upset...Our half-season leader looked lost...How could that happen, after he spent 2 years just getting comfortable? Well, I'll let an "expert" explain his understanding of the development of a west coast offense...How all the parties must know, what the other not only sees but is thinking as well...
Understanding the Broncos' offense (AND THE RAMS) - and why it isn't working (yet)
By
Laurie Lattimore-Volkmann and
shasta77 on Oct 23, 2015, 8:30a
Jason Miller/Getty Images
With all the debates - both rational and irrational - regarding Peyton Manning and our Broncos offense, it seemed the best way to survive this Bye Week drama would be to take a step back, take a deep breath and then dig in to some analysis that can perhaps enlighten the debate on the state of this offense.
Any football player who intends to play quarterback learns as early as Pop Warner days that the position can bring all the glory or all the shame - and both are usually fair to some extent.
After all, "QB1" is the field general and has to make the decisions for the team. So it stands to reason, that if he makes good ones, he gets saluted; bad ones and he gets shunned.
But as with anything, there are multiple people and multiple systems in play that must go right for the person in charge to pull it off.
So now that we've had a chance to let our frustration over the offense's struggles generally and Peyton Manning's interceptions specifically subside
a bit - and have realized that if nothing else, we are 6-0 - we can turn our critical eye toward
why the offense is faltering and argue about the best ways for the
current offense to overcome it (rather than just telling Manning to stop sucking.
Who would say that?)
To do this, I have enlisted shasta77 - a former player and coach who has grown up in a football household, learning to break down film at an early age from his player/coach father - "As both a player and later a coach, I would regularly hear one of my father's favorite phrases in my head, 'teach what you know, listen to what you don't, and let enlightenment happen when the two collide,'" shasta says. "It's a lesson that still teaches me every day."
Great advice. So let's roll up our sleeves and get ready to discuss/debate in the comments (maybe even learn) some strategy and solutions (and then I'll call Kubiak to let him know we've solved all his problems).
MHR- Before we get into the core of this discussion, what exactly is the "Tom Moore Offense" (which we've all been referring to as the "Manning offense")?
Shasta77: First off, as most of you know, I hate the term the "Manning Offense" because it does a huge disservice to what Tom Moore created. It would be like calling the West Coast Offense the Shanahan, Holmgren, Wyche, Reid offense (since none of them did anything but tweak and adjust what Bill Walsh established while they were under his or one of his disciple's tutelage.) The "Manning Offense" is at best a shuffle-step variation of what Tom Moore established with Manning at the helm. And a small one at that.
So what is it? At its core, it is designed to call several plays in the huddle, picking one at the line of scrimmage based on how the defense lined up. Marc Trestman, current offensive coordinator for the
Ravens, and Tony Dungy met Moore and this initial philosophy when Dungy was the starting QB and Trestman was the backup for Moore as offensive coordinator for University of Minnesota's Golden Gophers (in the early 70s, for the curious). This was long before Manning and why it is fundamentally the Moore offense and not the Manning offense.
In Moore's own words this is what his offense is all about (I can't say it any better):
"Simple is best. Do less but do it better. Out execute the defense and break their will. There comes a point in every game where one team breaks the other team's will. You do this by playing fast. The team that can play fast will break their opponent's will. The only way you can play fast is if you know what you are doing. The way you get to that point is by having a few plays that you rep over and over again. Most teams try and do too much."
So, "Do what your players do best" (sound familiar to what our DC thinks?) is the core of the Moore offense. It's an offense designed to not do a lot of shifts because you are never sure how the defense is going to line up, and you are not going to be able to check into a good play. It uses audibles to keep things simple because you only run certain plays vs. certain defenses so you don't have to practice them against everything. And it allows you to limit your play list and not waste reps in practice on plays you'll never call. Because the smaller the play-sheet, the less wasted "learning" you'll have.
One area that is fundamentally different in how Moore approached his play-sheet relative to many other coaching philosophies was in the red zone. That means more reps in practice - which means pick routes, fades, crossing routes, shovel passes and roll outs (usually left) - all designed to create confusion in a tight space and create a free release for at least one receiver. And the running calls in the red zone are built off this chaos because they come out of the same formations.
The next thing is first downs and how you "coax" a defense to relax. Obviously first down sets the tone for that series. So you use audibles to get you in the play you want and you plan repeats to coax the defense to be complacent. For example, you call two screen passes in a row or two play action passes in a row or even two stretch plays in a row. You're daring the defense to prepare for the potential that you won't call it again, and then you do, building more concern about what you might call next. And as a result, after you call the first one, they don't look for the second. The second play usually gains more than the first. This strategy BBQ'd the
Broncos in two consecutive playoff games against the
Colts/Moore/Manning.
The last piece in my Moore Offense treatise (apologize for it probably sounding like a sermon) is about technique. Moore was fanatical about being a teacher and not a lecturer. And his frequent examples of that were often Bellichick and Coughlin. They have simple schemes but they can teach the techniques that make those schemes work. Moore's thinking was designer offenses never last or win in the long run. Those offenses are a fad collection of plays that have no connection with one another. You have to give the players connection to the progression/combinations and the thinking, or its hard to teach and even harder to learn.
MHR - For comparison, what is the "Kubiak Offense" we all keep talking about?
Shasta77: Kubiak, by way of Shanahan, is part of the Bill Walsh coaching tree and as such his offensive philosophy is entrenched in the original West Coast offense approach. Walsh's West Coast Offense attempts to open up running and passing lanes for the backs and receivers to exploit, by causing the defense to concentrate on short passes.
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Since most down and distance situations can be attacked with a pass or a run, the intent is to make offensive play calling unpredictable and thus keep the defense's play "honest," forcing defenders to be prepared for a multitude of possible offensive plays rather than focusing aggressively on one likely play from the offense. Another key part of the Walsh implementation was "pass first, run later," which was Walsh's plan to gain an early lead by passing the ball, then run the ball on a tired defense late in the game, wearing it down further and running down the clock.
Another key element in Walsh's attack was the three-step drop-back instead of traditional seven-step drops or shotgun formations. The three-step drop helped the quarterback get the ball out faster resulting in far fewer sacks. "WCO" plays unfold quicker than in traditional offenses and are usually based on timing routes by the receivers.
In this offense the receivers also have reads and change their routes based on the coverage's presented to them. The quarterback makes three reads and if no opportunity is available after three reads, the QB will then check off to a back or tight end. It is not an offense that is historically entrenched in the use of the shotgun, but many from the Walsh family tree have employed it frequently. Shanahan began doing so with Elway in a game against the
Chicago Bears in 1987, and it became a primary part of the offense. Folks forget that the famous "helicopter play" actually came from shotgun with TD off to the right. The pistol is a nice compromise that guys like Brady, Rodgers, Rivers and Manning have added to a variety of formations to confound a defensive play-call that assumed shotgun.
MHR - Help us understand in X's and O's why this new offensive scheme is a tough transition for Manning, particularly the route tree combinations you have referred to.
Shasta77: Route combinations within an offense are as specific as your fingerprint. They are never the same from one offense to the next, particularly when they come from a fundamentally different philosophic influence (i.e. WSC vs. Moore Offense). So what does that mean? It means not just where a particular route might go on a specific play call, but all the surrounding routes of eligible receivers on that same particular play-call. This is probably best explained with a few examples to understand how varied this can really be (and then a lot of hand-waving by me).
And I am going to
shamelessly borrow some great work that Matt Bowen diagrammed at Bleacher Report because it's just that good.
First, we always and forever start with the route tree.It looks like this:
You may have many alternate names for these routes (stick, hitch, streak, etc.), but this is them in their original form. And on every play in every style of offense, you have different versions of these happening simultaneously across the formation.
But that's just the beginning of the complexity of the NFL (college to some degree, but not to the same extent), because off of these routes are multiple options. And depending on the coverage or how the defense plays a receiver post-snap, the routes that were called in the huddle can all change. A couple of route changes doesn't sound so difficult, right?
Time for us to go graphic again.
Again borrowing a diagram from Bowen, we have a great example of the options on the route tree waiting for
Calvin Johnson on this play. No they aren't all available, but it's typical that you have two to three outside coverage routes and two to three inside coverage routes for any one play per receiver.
And Megatron is reading the coverage to decide and signal (sometimes not) what route he's running - and that all can change at the snap of the ball. If the CB shows an inside technique post-snap, Megatron has only two outside options available (fade or comeback).
Matt Stafford will have to recognize the same CB technique and "know" that on this play Megatron will be running the comeback. If either sees it differently, the ball is in the wrong place, maybe even picked off. And this tandem awareness comes from many repetitions for this exact look and play-call.
A last-second CB technique change, giving Megatron an inside release, now means all the other routes are in play. And for this formation, play-call, down and distance, and overall coverage that might mean Megatron is immediately selecting between a post, dig, or drive route. Whichever he chooses has to be equally recognized by Stafford, who may or may not have seen the CB move outside prior to the snap.
In all this chaos, route combination repetition is the offense's best friend. And this is where things have changed dramatically this year. -Shasta77
Now picture this same collection of "choices" for all the other eligible receivers on the field. You can see how quickly the importance of receivers and QB reading the coverage exactly the same way and knowing what route that means they will be running. The defense shows a blitz look and the offense must now add hot routes to the mix, that everyone must immediately know to switch to or not. And this can often change post-snap, as the defense reveals the actual coverage and blitz package.
In all this chaos, route combination repetition is the offense's best friend. And this is where things have changed dramatically this year. Let's combine two snapshots form Bowen to show the difference in route combinations that Manning was used to versus what Kubiak's combinations typically look like.
Let's pretend this shot of
A.J. Green is
Emmanuel Sanders, and the mirror image of the route tree is for
Demaryius Thomas at the bottom of the screen:
And then we add in Norwood/Fowler/Caldwell in the slot:
A route combination that Manning ran 100s of times in this 11-personnel alignment would be: Sanders/Comeback, DT/Dig, and the Slot WR and TE running opposing drive routes across the defense. But that's a Moore route combo.
For Kubiak, that combo for the exact same play-call, formation, and coverage might be: Sanders/Fade, DT/Out, Slot/Seam, and TE/Flat. Now if there is quick pressure Manning is looking for receivers that aren't where his muscle memory says they should be. And if he read the coverage different than Norwood, he's looking for him to move to an option route to the outside—not the longer developing seam route.
Manning no longer can instantly "know" where all his receivers should be ... and he doesn't trust they will be there either. Welcome to the Broncos' 2015 passing dilemma. -Shasta77
The result? The Unholy Trinity - incomplete pass, sack, or INT - but none of them good. And if there is a blitz or quick pressure, it could be just as bad - because Manning no longer instantly "knows" where all his receivers should be - and since there have been more than a few route disagreements, he doesn't necessarily trust that they will be there either. Welcome to the Broncos 2015 passing dilemma.
Switching back to the route combinations of last year would immediately help the entire receiving core, not just Manning, because that's what they practiced all last year - and for those that were here, the year before that as well. Because Gase simply adopted those combinations into his game-plan to simplify the learning curve.
It would also bring the return of the rub routes, crossing routes, and option routes that allow Manning to find receivers much more easily in open space. Kubiak's route combinations have often done little to prevent defenses from crowding short interior throws creating congestion inside the numbers. The Moore route combinations are designed to attack exactly that tendency by a defense.
MHR - There's a lot of talk about Manning's "arm strength," "passing accuracy" and "decision-making." It is hard to defend those when you see passes in the dirt, passes overthrown and 10 interceptions so far. How do you explain those along with the tremendous ones that seem to have the Manning Touch we got used to?
Shasta77: As I described above, much of the unmade bed that has been our passing game is simply lack of familiarity with the route combos, so Manning is throwing to a spot where there is no receiver, or adjusted his throw late because of coverage or the receivers cut wasn't quite where Manning thought it would be (the INT on the throw to Hillman, where Manning originally was looking for DT), or because of a blitz with an incorrect hot route (the pick-6 against the Ravens and the one against SD a few years ago - because of Willis not recognizing the blitz).
Manning has also been fooled by some great coverage disguises a few times as well. The
Vikings and
Browns both gave him a late movement look that revealed the coverage was different than he thought it was. Happens to every QB. But when you see Manning clearly indicating to a receiver that he expected a different route, and it's game 6, that's a problem with the scheme - not the talent.
MHR - Was it even realistic for Manning to be able to adapt to this new way of reading a defense/calling the play in one offseason (particularly one where his top two receivers weren't even really involved)? Is it realistic to think there is still time to get it down in time for playoffs?
Shasta77: I believe it was realistic. But the biggest missing piece during OTAs was play-speed. In shorts and shells, it looks different than it does in a real game. And pressure changes your internal clock and reaction in a whole different way. When you cross the street in London all the crosswalks have a sign that tells you to look to the right. Why? Because the tourists are so used to looking to the left that they do and then step right in front of oncoming traffic. But if they move there, over time it becomes second nature to look to the right first.
With Sanders missing the preseason games for his hamstring injury, and DT missing the OTAs and still getting in football shape during training camp and preseason, even they didn't get the kind of reps that you need to commit it all to memory.
And you could tell in the first regular season games that the game-speed reps were sorely missing. Too many guys, Manning included, looked lost. The fact that the blocking was a shambles only made it worse because now you had a passing game that was often lost and hurrying to find the first open option - which leads to guessing and/or more pressure to make the right read.
But reps build trust and with that the game slows back down again - particularly if the pass protection continues to improve.
(
thank god!
)
MHR - There's a lot of discussion about Manning staying where he's seemingly most comfortable in the "shotgun" versus "under center" and whether a running game can really work well from the shotgun. Do you think this offense can have both - a QB at shotgun most of the time + a good running game? What will be the best way to keep improving the running game?
Shasta77: So many around MHR forget how often Elway was in shotgun from 1987 on. And that mostly worked pretty well. Even during the TD era, we ran a solid mix of shotgun and under-center. As I said before, the helicopter (that really clinched that we were going to win
the Super Bowl) happened from the shotgun with TD decoying run to the GB defense on Elway's right. To run from any formation you need enough attack balance across the whole field to make the defense either play honest or dare you to beat them to the edges if they stay inside. That's why the stretch play (or lead toss) is so important for any running attack. You don't attack outside, the defense will pack the middle, and then you likely can't run in the middle.
Whether the ball is being handed off from the pistol, shotgun, or under center only matters if you are doing nothing else to make the defense respect threats to the outside. Pete Carroll's success with calls like the Jet Sweep is predicated on taking advantage of backside over-pursuit and force the defense to spread out - and it is often run from the shotgun or pistol.
By using a slot receiver you aren't tipping your hand that it's coming from what looks like a passing formation. The TE screen we frequently ran with Sharpe would similarly qualify. It forced teams that were stacking the box to spread out even if Elway was in the shotgun, even when it wasn't an obvious passing formation. We simply need more of that deliberate play-calling that attacks the edges, and the formation won't matter - including where Manning is lined up.
MHR - if you were Kubiak and Dennison and Knapp this week, what would you be doing to "fix" these problems in the middle of the season?
Shasta77: Go back to the route combinations that Manning and the receivers repped countless times last year (and the year before). And call more "rhythm routes" that are easy throws to get the playmakers in space for YAC plays - much like New England does weekly for
Tom Brady, and Phillip Rivers did over 60 times against Green Bay last week.
And lastly, give Manning more time to survey the defense at the line of scrimmage. It doesn't matter if he's in the pistol, shotgun, or under center. Give him some no huddle series' to not just get in a rhythm but allow him to use that big brain to attack a personnel group that can't get off the field. That's how you start playing fast and force your will on the opposition.
As
Brian Billick wrote yesterday, "Don't give up on
Peyton Manning just yet."
(or Foles either)
And I'll add, don't give up on Foles yet either...I gotta listen to myself sometime....patience is hard...even for us old guys...
Wow, that was a load...I got a bunch of this from my boys at TST ...Go ahead and visit:grouphug: 
(ohh it's getting wild this week...Vikes fans are fired up!)
http://www.turfshowtimes.com/
enjoy... as you can tell,I've been waiting for this game for a while....Now I can hardly wait for the Bengals game after last night!!!!
