Ranger package, interesting, but wasn't effective

[Blue and Gold]

 

[jrry32]

Yea, I didn't like that. Trying to do too much. Just match up on their WRs with our CBs, put Ogletree or McDonald on Gates and let our rushers get after Rivers.

And if you can, slide someone into a zone over the middle to force Rivers to throw it deeper or to the sidelines.

 

[bomebadeeda]

Some of their "packages" yesterday is what burnt us. Almost everytime we would blitz one (or both....) of our LBers, River would have someone flash to the middle and be wide open for a good amount of yardage. But when we went base, they didn't rally have that good of options and we got them off the field. The draws also worked against us when we blitzed as the runner would wait till we got into our lanes and then go where there wasn't a lane covered. Give credit to them for making adjustments....but sometimes too cute doesn't get the offense off the field.

 

[Sum1]

Interesting...so can someone explain what the benefit of the package was supposed to be? Was there more to it other than just trying to confuse the QB?

 

[LesBaker]

View attachment 4214

Isn't that an illegal formation by the Chargers?

 

[LesBaker]

Interesting...so can someone explain what the benefit of the package was supposed to be? Was there more to it other than just trying to confuse the QB?

I think they overload one side with two guys blitzing so when the first guy gets picked up the second guy has a clear path to the QB.

 

[RhodyRams]

Isn't that an illegal formation by the Chargers?

looks to me like 85 is lined up in the neutral zone

 

[LesBaker]

looks to me like 85 is lined up in the neutral zone

Isn't it an illegal formation to have only one guy outside at the LOS?

 

[Fatbot]

Gates may be technically in the neutral zone but that normally wouldn't be called (unless it was the Rams of course)..

Isn't it an illegal formation to have only one guy outside at the LOS?

Formation seems fine, you can put any number of people outside the football, as long as there's at least 7 men on the line and eligible receivers are proper uniform # or check in. Lots of weird formations are possible, one example is "swinging gate" formations: http://media.philly.com/images/092013_Swinging-gate_400.jpg

 

[LesBaker]

Gates may be technically in the neutral zone but that normally wouldn't be called (unless it was the Rams of course)..


Formation seems fine, you can put any number of people outside the football, as long as there's at least 7 men on the line and eligible receivers are proper uniform # or check in. Lots of weird formations are possible, one example is "swinging gate" formations: http://media.philly.com/images/092013_Swinging-gate_400.jpg

OK thanks for the info........it looks like they only have 6 guys at the LOS though.

 

[Blue and Gold]

Interesting...so can someone explain what the benefit of the package was supposed to be? Was there more to it other than just trying to confuse the QB?

The theory is having different personnel in a normal package. It's a 40 nickle, and in this case it's putting two LBers in both A-Gaps. It's a very common look. In this case, the two LBers are DEs and the DE's are linebackers. The idea was to have Long and Quinn in A-Gaps, and JL and AO is DEs but with that it allowed the DEs to play coverage better, and you can get a good rush with the double A-gap pressure. It's a Jimmy Jones/Spags thing. The only difference is the switch in personnel and here, JL covers the slot (and allows a 1st down). But one or both of the "Lbers" could drop into middle zones, or one or the other could rush, the other drop, hre both rushed and JL "dropped" but it was a quick pass and rush couldn't get there

 

[Zaphod]

Awesome, thanks for the explanation!

 

[Blue and Gold]

Awesome, thanks for the explanation!

More info, on Double A gap package, the only differnce is where we were playing Lbers and DEs

http://www.si.com/vault/2009/12/28/105890984/lasting-impact

Lasting Impact
Blitzing is king in the modern NFL, and the Double A Gap Blitz, a legacy of late Eagles coordinator Jim Johnson, is one big game-changer. Here's how it works
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BY TIM LAYDEN
Originally Posted: December 28, 2009

Coaches leave footprints, and sometimes they're easy to spot: Cincinnati's stadium is named for Paul Brown, the Super Bowl trophy for Vince Lombardi, a chain of steak houses for Don Shula. Twenty-one coaches are in the Pro Football Hall of Fame, and dozens more are regulars on television, radio and the Web. And then there are the rest, whose tracks are much harder to find. Unless you know where to look.

Eagles defensive coordinator Jim Johnson died in July of complications from melanoma. He was 68 and had coached for 42 seasons at four colleges, in two professional leagues and with four NFL franchises. Except for his first job in the business, when he was hired at age 26 and spent two years as head coach at Missouri Southern, Johnson had always been an assistant on defense and never the boss. He performed exceptionally and was deeply respected by his peers. "He was hard on players and hard on coaches," says Rams coach Steve Spagnuolo, who worked under Johnson for eight years in Philadelphia, "but he had a heart bigger than you can imagine. He was tough on everybody because he was trying to get us ready for Sunday."

His players were intensely loyal. "So many games it was like Jim knew what was going to happen ahead of time," says veteran Eagles safety Quintin Mikell. "He'd tell me something, and then sure enough it went just like he said it would." To the public Johnson may have been largely anonymous, but within the NFL fraternity he was a star.

And in the manner of any gifted coach, his work outlives him. Professional football has changed fundamentally in the last quarter century. Offense has shifted from the ground to the air, from conservative to daring. Defenses have become wildly creative. Among the coaches who have led that metamorphosis are former Buccaneers coordinator Monte Kiffin, who designed the Tampa Two; Steelers coordinator Dick LeBeau (the zone blitz); and Jets coach Rex Ryan (the unpredictable, and as yet unnamed, movement of pass rushers).

Johnson, too, was a pioneer, using relentless blitzes (or their threat, nearly the same thing) to defend against the pass. That is the foundation of today's NFL game. "Right now in the NFL it's blitzkrieg," says Redskins offensive line coach Joe Bugel, a 33-year league coaching veteran. "If you're going to have your quarterback throw out of a seven-step drop, you better have about 12 offensive linemen."

You can see one particular stroke of Johnson's imagination in any game, on any weekend, and you'll see it in the playoffs too: the Double A Gap Blitz. Two linebackers blitz—or threaten to blitz—from positions on the left and right shoulders of the center (the A gaps), trying to get immediate pressure on the quarterback via the shortest route and forcing the offense into a series of quick and potentially dangerous decisions. "Every team in the league has a Double A Gap Blitz," says Eagles offensive tackle Winston Justice, "and it's a hard thing to block."

Like so many innovations, the Double A Gap is the product of all that came before it—mixed with one man's brainstorm. Johnson played college football at Missouri under coach Dan Devine from 1960 to '62. He was the starting safety as a junior and the starting QB in 1962 in a wing T backfield that included future NFL executive Bill Tobin and future NFL stars Andy Russell and Johnny Roland. The Tigers pounded opponents; Johnson attempted only 33 passes in the entire '62 season. "We ran the power sweep all day," says Tobin. Missouri went 8-1-2, completing a three-year run of 26-3-3, the best such stretch in Tigers history.

Johnson signed with the Bills out of Missouri, but after two years hobbled by injuries, he went into coaching. His first NFL job was from 1986 to '93 with the Cardinals, where the respected but conservative coordinator Fritz Shurmur became his mentor. When Johnson went to Indianapolis in 1994, his philosophy took a sharp turn. He was frustrated that his defense was getting nickel-and-dimed by the West Coast offense, with short passes that added up to long drives, and began conceiving unorthodox blitzes in response.

On Nov. 16, 1997, the 0--10 Colts knocked off the defending Super Bowl champion Packers 41--38 at the RCA Dome. Johnson's Colts blitzed all day and gave up 441 yards of offense, but they sacked Brett Favre three times, intercepted two passes and left a lasting impression on Green Bay assistant coach Andy Reid. "We scored a lot of points that day, but Jim destroyed our protections with his blitzes," says Reid. "I told myself if I'm ever lucky enough to get a head coaching job in this league, that guy is going to be my defensive coordinator."

Two years later Reid was named coach of the Eagles, and sure enough he hired Johnson, then 57, to run his defense. Johnson immediately installed multiple blitzes to exploit the weaknesses of pass-blocking schemes. "Jim wasn't worried about what teams did in the running game or how they ran pass routes," says Spagnuolo. "He studied protections and attacked them."

The Double A Gap arrived in 2001. The first time Johnson called it, Eagles defensive tackle Darwin Walker came in unblocked for a sack. From 2000 to 2008, Philadelphia was second in the NFL in sacks, with 390. Spagnuolo went to the Giants as defensive coordinator in 2007 and used the Double A as a foundation for the pressure defense that sacked Tom Brady five times and kept him under siege all night in New York's 17--14 upset win in Super Bowl XLII.

It has become one of the most common blitzes in the NFL, especially among teams that favor a 4--3 alignment. The Bears, Bills and Rams run it frequently, as do the Broncos and Patriots. Philadelphia runs it the most, though it is struggling with injuries and personnel this season. "The thing about the Double A," says linebacker Jeremiah Trotter, who was with the Eagles when Johnson installed the scheme and rejoined them this year for his third tour, "is that it doesn't really have a major weakness."

It begins most often with the defense's nickel personnel—five defensive backs—on the field with four down linemen and two linebackers in a 4-2-5 configuration (although it can be run from various other sets). As the offense reaches the line of scrimmage, the two linebackers move menacingly into the A gaps. If the quarterback is under center, the 'backers are eye-to-eye with him. "At that point it's mental gymnastics," says Jon Gruden, the former Raiders and Bucs coach who's now an analyst onMonday Night Football. "There's no doubt there's going to be some penetration in the middle if they blitz, and it's going to mess with your blocking schemes."

Texans quarterback Matt Schaub says, "We don't want to have somebody in my face right away. So the first thing the offensive line is going to do is adjust to protect those A gaps."

There are several ways to secure the middle, but all of them create weaknesses elsewhere.

• Gap (or squeeze) protection, in which both guards block down inside toward the center, putting three big bodies on the two blitzing linebackers. This, however, forces the offensive tackles to do one of two things. They can block down as well to pick up the two defensive tackles, but that leaves some combination of running backs and tight ends to deal with edge rushers like the Colts' Dwight Freeney, the Vikings' Jared Allen or the Broncos' Elvis Dumervil. Or the tackles can stay on the outside rushers, leaving the back to block a defensive tackle, another bad deal for the offense. "They're trying to create a negative one-on-one matchup with your halfback," says Denver quarterback Kyle Orton.

• Slide protection, in which the entire offensive line slides one way, with the center picking up one blitzer and a guard picking up the other. The same problem results—a defensive end is left to rush against a running back or, at best, a tight end or H-back.

• Straight protection, in which the center takes one blitzer and the other is allowed a free release to the running back, who must make a key block in the quarterback's lap. "This blitz has changed what you need in a running back," says Bugel. "He's got to be able to pass-block, or you really can't have him on the field."

Even if the back stops the blitzing linebacker, his involvement in that block prevents him from helping out on any other pass rusher. "You like to have your running back chip the defensive end, stick an elbow in the guy's ribs off the edge," says Gruden. "But if the defense shows a Double A Gap, that running back is going to be too late to chip, so you're one-on-one with Dumervil or Freeney on the outside."

Another consideration: It's perilous to leave the quarterback under center in the face of the Double A Gap Blitz. "It's imperative that you get into shotgun, to give the quarterback some breathing room," says former Giants coach Jim Fassel. "To do that you really need to do your homework and know what situations you might see it in." Even from the shotgun formation the ball must get into the air swiftly.

The most devilish aspect of the Double A is that the linebackers don't even need to blitz to make the play effective. The offense must adjust its blocking scheme on theassumption that the A Gap rushers are going to blitz, and once it does, "the offense tips its hand," says Mikell. "That's the whole thing with the Double A—make them adjust and then attack." Empty backfield sets, with five wide receivers, aren't practical against teams that run the Double A Gap Blitz. Also, defensive backs can sit on pass routes, anticipating quick throws that can be jumped for picks.

There are numerous other variations of the blitz. In '07 Spagnuolo rotated defensive ends Justin Tuck and Osi Umenyiora into the A gaps and linebackers Antonio Pierce and Kawika Mitchell to the edge, creating an even more daunting mismatch on the inside, with Tuck or Umenyiora on a running back or center. The Giants called that combination Bombs. Other teams drop both 'backers into coverage and rush a safety late, after the offense has adjusted for the A Gap rushers.

The best way to exploit the Double A Gap is to block it effectively, a difficult proposition says Gruden, but "if you're using it against a CEO-type quarterback, like Peyton Manning or Drew Brees, who understands how to pick up blitzes, you can have problems because you're short of personnel in coverage, and they'll get rid of the ball quickly."

Says Trotter, "Teams run quick screens, slants, things like that, because normal pass routes take too long, and the pressure is right on the quarterback. Jim Johnson always told us, 'You take away great receivers by getting in the quarterback's face.'"

They echo his messages in Philadelphia. Around the league they copy his plays. Johnson would appreciate that. During game week he could always be found in his office long after practice, working the coordinator's customary hours, searching for seams in somebody's offense. "He brought an energy and an enthusiasm to figuring things out," says Reid. "The players couldn't wait to hear how Jim was going gash 'em this week."

The best coaches will tell you their work is more cerebral than gladiatorial. The chess game, Gruden calls it. Double A Gap Blitz. One coach's legacy. One move on the board.

Now on SI.co

 

[Blue and Gold]

http://vikingsjournal.com/_/minneso...garing-the-a-gap—zimmers-pressure-du-jour-r92

Sugaring the A Gap—Zimmer's Pressure Du Jour
Sep 10 2014 04:10 AM | Arif Hasan in Minnesota Vikings

New head coach Mike Zimmer has been experimenting with pressure packages throughout the offseason and preseason, and in the first regular season game against the St. Louis Rams continued a strategy he's favored his entire career.

Image courtesy of Brace Hemmelgarn-USA TODAY Sports
Mike Zimmer is neither the kind of defensive coordinator to rely on the predictive playcalling of the previous regime, nor the kind of coordinator that relies on aggressive blitzing, like Houston, Arizona and Oakland did last year.

And though the defenses haven’t been “revealed” in the preseason, a lot of what Mike Zimmer has done in Cincinnati has shown up in camp and in the exhibition games that give us some clue as to his philosophy, and they appeared in the game against St. Louis.

On first and second down, Zimmer defenses tend to play to the fundamentals, but when they encounter a “passing down,” Zimmer really likes to let go.

One of the best ways to create unbalanced pressure while still dropping enough players into coverage—something that inspired the creation of the zone blitz—is to fake pressure and create pressure from somewhere else. Generally speaking, this is best done through showing pressure up the middle, often called “sugaring the A gap,” the two gaps between the center and the guards.

This is an extension of the nomenclature used to designate gap assignments, with the B gaps between the guards and tackles and the C gaps between the tackles and the tight end (or the sideline). Sometimes, the alley between the tight end and the sideline is referred to as the D gap, or simply the alley.

The important point here, though, is that showing “double A gap pressure,” or presenting a possible blitz through both A gaps, causes the most trouble for offensive lines and quarterbacks in determining blocking assignments.

The double A gap blitz is a product of Jim Johnson, the legendary former Philadelphia Eagles defensive coordinator, and it developed as a consistent defensive tactic in response to the increasing effectiveness of the West Coast Offense. Famously, Steve Spagnuolo used the tactic to great effect as the defensive coordinator of the New York Giants in 2007, responsible for New England’s ominous Week 17 close game and their famous loss in the Super Bowl that same, record-setting year.

Mike Zimmer’s use of the blitz package mirrors its most common usage patterns in recent history, as Tim Layden writes in Sports Illustrated:
Quote

It begins most often with the defense's nickel personnel—five defensive backs—on the field with four down linemen and two linebackers in a 4-2-5 configuration (although it can be run from various other sets). As the offense reaches the line of scrimmage, the two linebackers move menacingly into the A gaps. If the quarterback is under center, the 'backers are eye-to-eye with him. "At that point it's mental gymnastics," says Jon Gruden, the former Raiders and Bucs coach who's now an analyst on Monday Night Football. "There's no doubt there's going to be some penetration in the middle if they blitz, and it's going to mess with your blocking schemes."


In terms of how it affects pass protection schemes, it’s pretty simple. The defense is showing a seven-man blitz, which creates issues. If the protection unit is in man protection, then there’s a man that’s free (because teams are often in 6-man protection, at best). If the protection unit is in slide, or “area” protection, then a running back is responsible to cover the backside of the slide because the offensive linemen move into the gaps (zones) they are assigned to protect, leaving the backside free.

Usually, full-slide protection is used to protect on bootlegs and rollouts. It also leads to mismatches—though slide protection theoretically makes assignments easier to deal with stunts and twists, it can create issues if the defense has schemed a mismatch with a quicker defender attacking a slow-footed guard, or a tight end dealing with a powerful tackle.

The bigger difference in assignment is for the running back—offensive linemen in man protection will still swap stunting defenders. Instead, the running back is responsible for following a linebacker and protecting the quarterback from that specific person regardless of the gap they go through.

More often than not, offensive lines will engage in some sort of combo protection, explicit or not, in order to figure out their pass protection. That is, even those nominally engaged in man protection will pick up defenders in their area and expect others to do the same when not engaged.

The final method of protection involves dual-reading, where a player must read two players and make a call about who to block. Most often this involves running backs in man (or combo) protection, where they will read the linebackers inside-out (Mike to Sam), covering their blitzes in that order (if both blitz, the running back blocks the Mike).

These become more complicated when safeties and slot corners threaten to blitz as they not only screw up the assignments but add players that need to be accounted for. Generally speaking, Mike Zimmer and defenses in general will not likely rush more than seven, as the offense is probably going to send four of its five eligible receivers out in routes, and that would leave players uncovered.

Blocking with more doesn’t usually result in more protection; as Aaron Rodgers noted not too long ago, you may be able to better protect the quarterback by giving him enough receiving options. In the case of dealing with seven or eight-man looks, six-man protection is usually fine because a receiver will get a free release, and in an offense with sight adjustments (Schottenheimer’s offense with St. Louis includes them, though not to the degree that McDaniel’s offense with New England does), that receiver should adjust their route to be wide open.

In this way, the quarterback is “responsible” for the extra rushers. In the example above, where the running back dual-reads the Mike and the Sam and both rush, the quarterback is the one who accounts for the Sam by throwing it hot to the checkdown or hot route—the new route that the receiver runs in response to the blitz.

Sugaring the A gap was responsible for the first third down success in the preseason, when Schaub’s receiver failed to adjust to the blitz look and ran his normal route while Schaub expected him to run a comeback. The pressure and the failure to respond led to the incompletion:

In the end, the Vikings only ended up rushing five and confused coverage calls by dropping players like Brian Robison into coverage (if, for example, the tight end was supposed to be the hot route, Robison would have been able to cover it).

There are some clear issues with man blocking, which include the fact that a stunting Sharrif Floyd would have been very difficult to handle on a stunt. But slide protection would have caused issues, too:

That leaves the running back to either block a defensive end (something Norv Turner has expressed a few times something he doesn't want his offense to do) or the safety. Two free rushers are a little too much to handle.

In the end, the Oakland Raiders chose half-slide, half-man protection like the vast majority of teams on the vast majority of snaps. Though this would generally have done well against a greater number of rushers than the Vikings eventually sent, Minnesota still put pressure on the quarterback while dropping six in coverage.

Against the Rams, the Vikings showed double A gap pressure again, this time leading to a sack by Harrison Smith, coming off the edge again.

The Vikings showed eight-person pressure and rushed seven, leaving one defender to cover each receiver running routes, also known as "man-free" coverage. If the Rams kept a tight end in to block the seventh person (which would have shifted the assignments down the right side of the line), then the safety up top, Robert Blanton, would have rotated into a Cover-1 look shaded to the strength of the formation (where two receivers are lined up).

Instead, he picks up crossing receiver. Because of the added difficulties of this kind of pressure, defensive linemen who do not immediately penetrate drop back into short zones in order to disrupt any hot routes. The pressure package looked like this, and it was designed to put the center in a bind.

And though the center determined who to block quickly enough, the other A gap rusher needed to be picked up. With the running back occupied with Anthony Barr, Harrison Smith had a free release off the edge—both the left tackle and left guard had assignments with Everson Griffen and Sharrif Floyd.

The biggest beauty to this play design, however, is who the quarterback is responsible for: Harrison Smith.

Generally speaking, the person the quarterback is responsible for with seven- or eight-man pressure is a person who is playing on the same side of the formation as his progression. In his pre-snap reads, the quarterback needs to make a determination as to which half of the field he will begin his progressions (where the first and second reads almost always are) before he scans the rest of the field.

That creates an issue in this case because Harrison is coming off the open side of the formation (the "1" in the 3x1 alignment the Rams played on that down), where the quarterback wasn't beginning his reads. While in a broad sense this is the quarterback's fault (the Vikings were signalling off-man, which they ended up playing)—the receiver on that side of the field breaks inside to get open against that look—it's situationally still a loss because the Rams were on 3rd and 8, and that likely would not have converted.

In either case, the Vikings come out ahead. The protection scheme had an answer for everybody, even if the quarterback didn't execute that answer, but those responses would have led to a quick, short gain on third and long. Further, there's a chance Robert Blanton could have peeled off of his man to intercept the ball thrown to the open side of the formation.

Other solutions could have put the running back on Harrison and slid the center, right guard and right tackle inside, with the quarterback throwing hot against Captain Munnerlyn. Unfortunately for the Rams, it creates the same problems, as Tavon Austin ran a route depth at two yards and Lance Kendricks runs his spot route three yards from the line of scrimmage.

It still would have been better to dump off to Tavon Austin and hope for yards after the catch—that's why he was drafted—but the Vikings will consistently take short yardage passes on third and long and be happy to do so.

In large part, this was successful because the Rams' third string quarterback, and undrafted sophomore from Southern Miss, wasn't ready to handle that kind of pressure, and he couldn't direct the offensive line to maximize his time in the pocket. Some quarterbacks like to call for a rollout there, but that likely would have caused issues, as the Vikings on the strong side (Munnerlyn and Robison) would likely not have bit on play-action on third and long, or at the very least would play contain before reverting to rushing an unprotected passer.

Zimmer doesn't always send linebackers to rush the A gaps when showing six, seven or eight man pressure, but the threat of the blitz confuses blocking assignments enough that twists will be particularly effective.

That's another wrinkle to that specific rush the Vikings put on Austin Davis, with Robison and Johnson both taking a step upfield in the gaps they traditionally attack before moving inside—Greenway abandoning the A gap shortly before Johnson attacks it can often lead to unaware blockers allowing pressure. In fact, Johnson does get inside and gets to the quarterback; he may have been able to take him down if Harrison didn't do it first.

Sugaring the A gap doesn't have to lead to linebacker blitzes in order to be effective, and there are other instances when the Vikings dropped both linebackers in coverage while still getting pressure as a result of this tactic.

Here, the Vikings dropped both linebackers and only rushed four, but were still able to get the one-on-one matchups they wanted in order to force the quarterback to throw quickly—the center didn't double anyone.

In this case, the quarterback was able to get the ball to his receiver and was one yard short, but rushing throws is still good. Note that the running back delayed his release into a route simply because of the threat of pressure.

Like any blitz or pressure package, it isn't magic. But it's definitely a weapon in the Vikings' arsenal, especially on third down, when the sticks are seven to twelve yards away from the line of scrimmage. The Vikings sacrifice some speed on their pass drops and occasionally will sacrifice players in coverage, but the payoff seems to be well worth it.

Though the Vikings haven't done anything in this regard that hasn't been done hundreds of times in the NFL (Jim Johnson brought it into the fore in 1994), but it's a healthy addition to a defense that badly needed a shot in the arm.