MMQB: 10 Thoughts on Free Agency

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http://mmqb.si.com/mmqb/2017/03/14/nfl-free-agency-business-football-10-reflections-andrew-brandt

10 Thoughts on Free Agency
Moneyball comes to the NFL, fullbacks are getting paid and the Cowboys are in a tough spot with Tony Romo’s salary-cap hit. Plus a look at the “golden-ticket” winners, the barely there guarantees for some veterans, and the latest dysfunction in Washington
By Andrew Brandt

We aren’t even a full week into the 2017 League Year, and already there’s a lot of news to analyze following the opening of free agency. Settle in.

1. Having been around the business of sports my entire professional career, I am oddly giddy about the Texans-Browns trade involving Brock Osweiler—a trade that brings the NFL into the 21st century.

As previously written in this space, I had lobbied the NFL for years about allowing the trading of money and/or salary cap room; these proposals were always denied. The NBA and Major League Baseball have always had trades that involve variables such as cap space, expiring contracts and future assets, while these concepts have been foreign to the NFL. Until now.

The Browns only took on the albatross of the second year of Osweiler’s Texans’ contract, a fully guaranteed $16 million, so that they could acquire a 2018 second-round pick (a couple of lower-round picks were also exchanged).

The Browns’ hiring of former MLB analytical guru Paul DePodesta as their chief executive is now in motion; Billy Beane (and Sam Hinkie) would be proud, as the Browns, with ample cap room and a billionaire owner, are paying $16 million for a valuable future asset.

Or possibly not. The Browns may turn around and trade the pick, a move complicated by the same $16 million guaranteed salary precipitating the first move. My sense is that the Browns will have to pay off some of that $16 million through a bonus—something allowed and done before—and trade the rest of the contract for a draft pick and/or player.

For example, they may give Osweiler an $8 million bonus and then trade him and his $8 million salary (high backup quarterback money) for a mid-round pick.

Clearing up one misconception out there about the Browns “needing to spend all that cap room.” Minimum spending thresholds—which I think are too low, but that is another story—are only accounted every four years, with the last accounting having just ended. The Browns, and all teams, won’t be judged on their spending until after the 2020 season.

Moneyball and “trust the process” have (finally) entered the NFL.

2. In my time in Green Bay managing the cap, I resisted the annual temptation to mortgage (restructure) Brett Favre’s contract for cap purposes—“short-term gain for long-term pain”—so we would not leave a large cap charge in his wake (his “dead money” was $600,000).

My not-so-humble brag is relevant now that Tony Romo leaves behind a cap charge of $19.6 million, whether taken as a hit this year or spread out between this year and next. The Cowboys will be operating with this debit on their cap, their highest player cap charge, for a player who will likely end up playing elsewhere.

I know I have been critical of teams like the Cowboys or Saints in their cap management, but there are consequences such as 1) letting players go to market rather than being able to be proactive and lock them up and 2) not playing with a full deck due to non-roster charges eating up cap space. The Cowboys are now paying the bill on Romo; Drew Brees’s bill with the Saints will come due in the next couple of years.

3. Speaking of quarterbacks, I am not surprised that the Bears are paying Mike Glennon $14.5 million average per year (APY) and $18.5 million guaranteed. Scarcity creates value; teams never let quarterbacks with any discernible level of production hit the market (Peyton Manning in 2012 was perhaps a once-in-a-lifetime situation).

Look at this year's quarterback market: Brian Hoyer, Josh McCown, Geno Smith, Tony Romo, Jay Cutler, etc. Glennon looks like a runway model compared to this motley crew.

Glennon and Tyrod Taylor—newly restructured with the Bills—now fill a void in the veteran quarterback marketplace between “starter” money—over $17 million APY—and “backup” money of $3-10 million APY.

4. Like every year, there are 15-20 golden-ticket winners, with this year’s group including Stephon Gilmore, Calais Campbell, AJ Bouye, Andrew Whitworth and more.

But even for these players, the best of the best with the most leverage in the league, the contracts are “two years and we’ll see.” I am not sure what it’s going to take to get better security in these deals.

Perhaps one way to make incremental change is when the team says it will guarantee $25 million on a five year deal, the agent demand that they guarantee $5 million each year, rather than all $25 million secured in the low-risk first two years of the deal. Agents with this kind of leverage have to lead the charge toward fuller guarantees, and that continues to be lacking.

5. In addition to not breaking the seal of fuller guarantees, only one deal changed the top of the market for their positions, although a couple are at the top level.

Kyle Juszczyk’s $21 million deal over four years with the 49ers more than doubles the top of the established fullback market of roughly $2.3 million APY. Beyond this stunning number, the Bills signed not one, but two free-agent fullbacks (Tom Tolbert and Patrick DiMarco). The position—one that several teams have chosen to proceed without—had perhaps its best day in history on Thursday. Fullbacks...who knew?

6. Speaking of the 49ers, who were highly aggressive with a depleted roster, a theme of familiarity and professionalism ran through their signings.

Kyle Shanahan knows Brian Hoyer and Pierre Garçon as players with a high work ethic and qualities of leadership, toughness and character. Garçon leveraged the interest of another incoming coaching staff that had coached him and knew his character—the Rams—into an astounding deal for a 30-year old receiver ($20.5 million guaranteed). Coaches love players like Hoyer and Garçon, and it showed this week. Character counts, and has value.

7. Even on the first day of free agency—the best day of the year for player-friendly deals—there were a surprising number of one-year deals and deals with no security.

The Eagles particularly leveraged players not seeing the market they hoped with Alshon Jeffery taking a one year, $9.5 million deal (plus incentives) and Torrey Smith and Chance Warmack receiving only $500,000 guaranteed, an amount the Eagles will not hesitate eating. Forget the guidelines of “two years and we’ll see” or even “one year and we’ll see”—these are “let’s see in a few months.” Perhaps the legal tampering period gave these players an early dose of reality.

8. Dysfunction, mistrust and partisanship in Washington, DC … imagine that? I have known recently deposed general manager Scot McCloughan since 1999, when he was an area scout with the Packers. I have always found him to be a skilled evaluator of talent. With the Redskins’ preemptive strike to fire him for “for cause”—voiding the team’s obligation to pay him for the next two years, we know there will be (and probably have already been) lawyers.

However, I would expect and hope that Bruce Allen (a former agent turned team executive like myself) has thoroughly vetted whether he is on solid ground in firing Scot. Buckle up; this dispute may take a lot longer to resolve than the Kirk Cousins situation.

Speaking of which…

9. Although clearly in the minority on this, I wrote last week defending the Cousins repeat-tag strategy as reasonable in using the powers given by the CBA to retain the team’s most important player.

Cousins’ inherently agreeable nature made it virtually impossible for him to stage any rumble of discontent; no one would ever believe his actions were sincere. He has signed his one-year contract and no, he is not getting traded. As for a long-term deal, I think that could still happen: it is surprising how enmity can fade when there is a deadline and tens of millions at stake.

Two things happened last Friday: the Browns released Robert Griffin III, the player for whom the Redskins mortgaged the future to draft in 2012, and Cousins—taken by the same team in the same draft in the fourth round—signed a one-year deal for $24 million. Life comes at you fast.

10. Often the biggest deals are not with new teams, but rather with existing ones. Deals for Nick Perry, Brandon Williams, and Chandler Jones were examples of teams spending big on free agents, just not on players coming from other teams. One misconception about teams being “active” is that it necessarily means spending externally; often the biggest spending teams do so internally (last year’s Eagles were a prime example).

Winning in March usually does not translate into winning in January. For the sake of their fans of teams like the Jaguars and Browns, let’s hope there are better translations ahead.

Finally, some names still sitting and waiting for a market—any market—to develop read like a 2014 Pro Bowl roster: Romo, Jay Cutler, Adrian Peterson, Jamaal Charles, Darrelle Revis, Colin Kaepernick, LeGarrette Blount and more.

The NFL: Not For Long. Indeed.
 

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https://theringer.com/nfl-free-agency-offensive-line-hierarchy-6cfa2f8d2124#.azt1ht3o9

Free Agency Shook Up the NFL’s Offensive Line Hierarchy
Last week brought major roster shuffling, nowhere more than along the offensive line. Which teams followed the lead of the Cowboys and Raiders and built around their fronts?
Robert Mays
Staff Writer, The Ringer

We’re about a week into the NFL free-agency period, and most of the dust has already settled. The sheer madness of last Wednesday and Thursday all but guaranteed that, aside from the lingering possibility of a couple moves involving quarterbacks (Tony Romo heading to another team; a franchise potentially trading for Kirk Cousins or Jimmy Garoppolo), the tail end of this offseason’s spending spree was going to be relatively quiet. That makes now a good time to survey the major changes to the league’s landscape, and this year there’s only one logical place to start.

Amid all the roster overhauls, no position group experienced more turnover than the offensive line. Following the signings that have already happened, nine different teams — nearly one-third of the league — have at least two new starters penciled in along the line, and that’s before the shake-ups that will inevitably happen during next month’s draft.

That’s a lot of shuffling in an area where teams have long valued continuity. Examining the factors at play, it’s clear how these transformations came to be.

The sheer number of high-end guards available on the market ensured that teams looking to upgrade were going to have options. Four of this year’s free-agent guards — T.J. Lang (Lions), Ronald Leary (Broncos), Larry Warford (Saints), and Kevin Zeitler (Browns) — are now among the 13 highest-paid players in the league at the position (in terms of guaranteed money).

The talent up for grabs was abundant, and with over half the league entering 2017 free agency at least $30 million under the salary cap, the number of teams in the mix for the top guys meant a hefty payday.

Even at left tackle, where the talent pool was considerably worse, the available money on the market led to monster deals for the likes of Matt Kalil ($31 million guaranteed from Carolina), Russell Okung ($25 million guaranteed from the Los Angeles Chargers), and Riley Reiff ($26.3 million from Minnesota). Reiff was more effective than either Kalil or Okung in 2016, but he also spent the season serving as the Lions’ right tackle.

There’s a reason that Detroit drafted Taylor Decker in the first round of last year’s draft and slid Reiff to the right side: He’s miscast as an NFL left tackle, and while his floor is significantly higher than that of Kalil or Okung, his five-year, $58.8 million deal would be an overpay in nearly any other offseason.

In the case of the Chargers, Vikings, and Panthers, something needed to be done along the line, and for all three that meant doling out onerous deals to players with spotty track records. Both Minnesota and Los Angeles ranked among the league’s worst units last fall; overpaying for a slight upgrade was worth it to both franchises.

For the Vikings, this offseason’s spending spree also included handing former Carolina tackle Mike Remmers — whom the Panthers signed off the Rams practice squad in 2014 — a five-year, $30 million deal with $10.5 million guaranteed.

Keeping track of all the recent signings can feel like playing a game of Musical Linemen, particularly in the case of Remmers and Kalil, who are essentially swapping teams. The abundance of cap space led to huge deals for players who have underperformed, and that was hardly the only effect.

With so many general managers being able to toss around cash like oil barons, teams had the flexibility to remake their lines on the fly, cherry-picking the guys they covet rather than sticking with known commodities. The Vikings replacing Reiff with Kalil is a useful example, but what happened in Detroit is even more fascinating.

The right side of the Lions line last season consisted of Larry Warford at guard and Reiff at tackle. Both were desired on the open market, with Reiff sniffing the top five in guaranteed money among left tackles and Warford securing more in guarantees than the Steelers’ David DeCastro got in his 2016 extension.

Still, in building the new version of its line, Detroit chose to invest resources elsewhere. By swapping Warford for T.J. Lang (at a similar price, though Lang is four years older) and signing the slightly cheaper Rick Wagner to replace Reiff, Detroit arguably got better at both positions while spending about $3.5 million less in guaranteed money than it would have if it had tried to retain Warford and Reiff.

The Lions were able to withstand losing two solid, homegrown players and maybe even get better in the process. That’s rare, and it signals not only the shifting nature of free agency in 2017, but also the league’s changing priorities.

Two ingredients — teams having money to spend and prized players being available to cash in — were necessary to facilitate the line rearranging that happened in the past week. Those weren’t the only factors, though. Front offices surely drew motivation from last season’s on-field developments, as both the Cowboys and Raiders broke out as surprise contenders thanks in large part to offenses that were constructed around their lines.

The Cowboys famously spent three first-round draft picks in four years on offensive linemen, assembling the best unit in football in the process. The Raiders signed All-Pro mauling guard Kelechi Osemele to a market-setting five-year, $58.5 million deal (with $25.4 million guaranteed) last offseason, officially making their group the most expensive in the league. The methods and resources were different, but the message was the same: It’s worth spending on the big guys up front.

No team followed that ideal more closely this offseason than the Browns. In signing J.C. Tretter (center) and Kevin Zeitler (guard) and extending Joel Bitonio (guard), Cleveland dished out $65.2 million in guaranteed money to offensive linemen. Zeitler, the 27-year-old former first-round pick by the Bengals, reset the market for his position by inking a deal worth $12 million annually that includes $31.5 million in guarantees.

The only players who sit between Zeitler and Bitonio ($23 million guaranteed) on the NFL’s list of highest-paid guards by guaranteed money are Osemele and Leary. Within a span of 24 hours last week, the Browns went from having a hole at right guard and a left guard set to make $1.7 million in the final year of his rookie deal to having two of the four most expensive guards in the league.

Factor in the contract for superstar left tackle Joe Thomas, and Cleveland now has $47 million tied up in its offensive line, the highest mark in the league and a huge jump from its ranking of 22nd ($15 million) last season.

Just like that, the Browns went from having a league-average offensive line to one of the best. Entering free agency with $102 million in cap room, GM Sashi Brown decided to shape his roster around the offensive line.

The influx of talent to places like Cleveland (or Denver, with its additions of guard Ronald Leary and tackle Menelik Watson) means that other teams had to rummage for replacements. In Leary’s case, that replacement (La’El Collins) was already on the Cowboys’ roster, but Dallas is a good example of how quickly a dominant line can be left searching for answers.

Collins has a reservoir of ability and opened last season as the Cowboys’ starter at left guard, but to date he’s been far less reliable than Leary. And beyond losing Leary, Dallas will head into next fall without right tackle Doug Free, who announced his retirement last week. Its contingency plan at the position appears to be 2015 third-round pick Chaz Green, who has two career starts. Compared to the limited but predictable contributions of Free, the unknown of Green is an unwelcome alternative.

Then there’s the Bengals’ situation. Along with losing Zeitler, they also watched longtime left tackle Andrew Whitworth take a three-year, $33.8 million deal from the Rams. Cincinnati’s front office has been preparing for life after Whitworth for a while; in 2015 it used first- (Cedric Ogbuehi) and second-round (Jake Fisher) picks on offensive tackles despite boasting one of the league’s best and most complete lines at the time.

With Whitworth and right tackle Andre Smith both leaving in free agency (Smith just re-signed with the team after spending a year in Minnesota), this is the season that Fisher and Ogbuehi were expected to fill full-time starting roles. The problem is that so far neither has proved to be a good option protecting the edge.

The uncertainty in draft picks’ development has the potential to throw a wrench in even the best-laid plans. The Bengals sketched out a future beyond Whitworth and Zeitler, but two years later nothing about that sketch has moved to becoming reality.

That’s an issue the Browns, Lions, and others that spent big along the line this week won’t have to consider. Free agency encourages teams to overpay for top talent, and for players like Zeitler, Lang, and Reiff, that price comes with a certainty tax. For organizations like Cleveland and Detroit, though, the cost is worth it — they’ve raised the floor for their respective offenses.

https://theringer.com/nfl-free-agency-players-losing-leverage-864759d6cbdb#.bhqu7pxvr

How NFL Players Lost Their Leverage
The best free agents are making more money than ever, but the high-earnings headlines mask an ugly fact: The gap between the league’s haves and have-nots is widening dangerously — and there might not be a solution in sight
Kevin Clark
Staff Writer, The Ringer


It’s a good time to be an in-demand NFL player, as record spending is making the league’s top free agents richer than ever. As of Tuesday, NFL teams had spent $1.9 billion on unrestricted targets through the first six days of free agency, with $922 million of that guaranteed. Last spring, teams spent $1 billion guaranteed over six weeks. For valuable players hitting the market at the right moment, big deals are the new normal.

For everyone else, though, settling is. The rising salary cap, which sits at $167 million for the 2017 season — up $12 million from last year and $47 million from 2011, the first season of the league’s current collective bargaining agreement — has altered spending patterns in the NFL.

And though earnings are rising for the top free agents, a confluence of events has caused them to shrink for those lower on rosters, eradicating the NFL’s middle class and costing its lower tier much of its leverage.

Larger training camp and practice squad rosters mean more players competing for spots on the active roster, robbing those on the fringes of true bargaining power. The rookie wage scale, introduced in 2011 to theoretically push more money toward veterans, has actually hurt aging nonstars, who wind up negotiating below-market deals based on their low initial salaries.

And of course, NFL teams remain self-interested even amid the rising cap, reducing their own financial burden using little-known, widely implemented mechanisms like split contracts and per-game roster bonuses.

It wasn’t supposed to be like this. “The goal of [the 2011 CBA] was to give more money to the middle class,” says Mark Dominik, a former Tampa Bay Buccaneers general manager, who’s now an analyst for ESPN. “Instead, what happened was teams rewarded star players, and it created a cavernous pit between types of contracts. It’s a have-and-have-not league.”

NFL teams have always considered lower-rung players disposable. Now, however, franchises have become expert at stacking the deck against those with the least leverage, further splitting rosters into two clusters with vastly different circumstances.

“We’re in a challenging time,” says Rams general manager Les Snead. “I’ve heard [former Colts executive] Bill Polian talk about the concept of ‘monetary dysfunction,’ where you have problems in the locker room because guys are saying, ‘Hey, why is this guy getting this money?’ … The market used to be outdated annually; now it’s outdated on a player-by-player basis. The paradigm shifts constantly. … There’s going to be a natural jealousy.”

During the 2015 season, Ronnie Hillman led the Super Bowl champion Denver Broncos in rushing yards and touchdowns. At training camp seven months later, the Broncos, flush with running backs, released Hillman from the $2 million contract they’d signed him to earlier in 2016. Instead of resuming his role as Denver’s lead back, Hillman had to face the open market a week before the season began.

Absent his leverage, he signed a league-minimum deal with the Minnesota Vikings two weeks into the season worth a prorated $760,000 and featuring what is called an “injury split,” which would cost him hundreds of thousands of dollars if he wound up on injured reserve.

As guaranteed money has risen for the NFL’s haves, split contracts have become increasingly prominent for the have-nots. These deals put the risk almost entirely on the player by not guaranteeing the full amount of money unless he stays healthy all season. For example, Donald Brown’s deal with the Patriots last season called for $965,000 total, but a prorated drop to $453,000 if Brown hit IR.

This mechanism used to be reserved for late-round draft picks and veterans with extensive injury histories. But according to multiple NFL team executives, over the past few seasons splits and other similarly pro-team, anti-player contract clauses like per-game bonuses have started to creep into more veteran deals than ever before.

Nick Greisen, a former NFL player who now sells injury insurance to NFL players, estimates that players leaguewide lost $28 million in salary due to these injury clauses in 2015, up from $19 million in 2013 and $23 million in 2014.

“[Teams] are going to try to keep their money in their pockets as much as possible,” Hillman says. “The league is cheap, man. And you kind of learn they don’t really take care of you like that.” Hillman, who was placed on waivers by the Vikings and picked up by the Chargers in November, says he signed his split contract because “I knew I wasn’t going to get hurt,” but also says he feels for the growing group of players facing slanted negotiations.

Hillman believes that the CBA should include more provisions to protect veterans and laments how quickly players are flushed out of the league if they find themselves off a roster for even a moment. “There are lots of things you’d want to change about the CBA,” Hillman says. “But for me, it’s definitely how they handle players out of the league, trying to get another [team].

I can’t complain about that because I got picked up, but just hearing how other players struggle to get back in, or look to the [National Football League Players Association] for help, it just sucks to see your friends go through it.” (The Vikings declined to comment.)

Since the cap started rising, NFL teams have performed a master class in reducing their own financial risk at the expense of lower-earning players. In addition to identifying the proliferation of injury splits, people inside the NFL — from team executives to agents — point to the growing number of contracts built in part on per-game bonuses, which stem from being on the active roster, meaning that to get their maximum salary each week, a player must be on the 46-man game-day roster, not just the 53-man overall roster. Greisen says his data shows that players lost $20 million leaguewide in 2016 due to per-game bonuses.

According to former agent and salary cap analyst Joel Corry, teams started to sparingly insert per-game bonuses for oft-injured players around 2001. The clause spread slowly. In 2006, Andrew Brandt, then the vice president and head negotiator for the Green Bay Packers and now an analyst for ESPN, inserted per-game bonuses into contracts for running back Ahman Green, who’d dealt with injuries, and defensive back Charles Woodson, the former Raiders star who hadn’t played a full season in his last four years in Oakland. Woodson got healthy and regained superstar status in Green Bay, which helped the clause gain popularity.

“NFL contracts allocate the most risk to the player of any sport,” says Brandt. “And like any business, once you have a policy — and we liked [these bonuses] — it was easier to point to other players and say, ‘Hey, our star, Charles Woodson, did this,’ and then you start to make it look like every player has it. It was something that was fortuitous, that a couple guys [coming] off injury signed it, when it seemed so antithetical to everything [players would sign], but then it became universal.”

Now, the clauses are a staple in a copycat league full of teams eager to protect their interests and control costs. Colin Kaepernick’s 2015 deal, for instance, included up to $2 million in per-game payments; he lost $875,000 when he went on injured reserve that year. Robert Griffin III stood to gain $750,000 in per-game bonuses last season with Cleveland, but played just five times due to a shoulder injuryand earned just over $200,000 in bonuses instead.

Jason Fitzgerald, who founded the website Over the Cap and has consulted for half a dozen NFL teams, says these bonus clauses are a way for teams to gain an edge on players who won’t agree to a split contract. He cited Green Bay’s Jordy Nelson, who has suffered injuries but is valuable enough to dodge the split language historically reserved for bottom-of-the-roster players. Instead, Fitzgerald says, Nelson took $500,000 of his contract per year in per-game form.

“As an agent I hated those things with a passion, because a lot of things can cost players money,” says Corry. “Things like if late in the season, when a team has clinched a playoff berth, they want to rest starters and make a guy inactive, then you’re costing the guy money. But you’re seeing those deals a lot more.”

Different people trace different paths to today’s haves-and-have-nots league. The 2011 CBA — the decade’s most argued-over collection of pages this side of Jonathan Franzen — certainly shaped the larger football labor market, but it doesn’t come close to explaining everything.

George Atallah, the NFL Players Association’s assistant executive director of external affairs, says the league’s distinct classes are the teams’ doing. “The things we are seeing are not a function of the system,” Atallah says, “they are a function of how teams behave.”

In fact, Atallah says, in many ways the CBA is working as hoped: During negotiations, the union’s goals were to maximize players’ share of the league’s revenue and make as much money as possible available to free agents. Atallah mentions that the percentage of guaranteed money has risen from just under 50 percent before the latest CBA to around 65 percent now.

But he notes that teams’ insistence on putting bad language in deals is problematic, saying that the union’s job at this time of year has shifted to advising agents on the kind of contract clauses to watch for and fight against.

And that language is pervasive: Brandt notes that in the same way coaches crib schemes from others, copycat front offices mimic the contract negotiations occurring elsewhere. When teams gather at the annual meetings, the league’s management council (a group of owners and team executives) often discusses contract structures.

“They are careful not to recommend, ‘This team is doing this or that,’ but they’ll show you examples of language and what teams are doing, and you learn best practices,” Brandt says, adding that the presenters are careful not to even imply that teams should collude. Most of the talk in these meetings, Brandt says, focuses on themes like splits or voiding certain guarantees under extenuating circumstances, such as suspensions or off-field problems.

Brandt traces part of the have-nots’ decreased leverage to the rookie salary scale, which prohibits players from negotiating a new deal for the first three years of their contract. While that pushes more money to veterans as intended, it does so only in some cases, as this year’s notable free agents are discovering.

The scale also depresses the value of some second contracts, since teams are negotiating extensions with players who are still on heavily cost-controlled deals. “You get to say, ‘You can take the offer we’re putting in front of you or you can play another season for a million dollars,’” Brandt says. “It takes a very, very special player to turn down an extension in their fourth year, because the rookie contracts are so low.”

As such, the pool of players who hit the open market at a peak time is remarkably low, because true superstars typically get locked into below-market deals a year early, or find themselves playing on franchise tags.

Joe Banner, a former Eagles and Browns executive, says he’s shocked by how many players are willing to take deals that are based on old contracts, especially with the rising cap increasing teams’ spending.

“I’m baffled by the two distinctly different worlds,” Banner says. “There are two markets — the players who re-sign off old deals and players who let the market value them. We have seen instances where the gap is so large that it’s hard to believe that that’s the best they could have done.”

This, he says, is part of the problem in the NFL: Players who should have leverage are signing deals well below what’s warranted due to the “perceived risk” (potential injury and declining play, among others) of not signing as soon as possible.

And that’s how the NFL split into two classes.

Fitzgerald paints a grim picture of a league in which teams are getting even craftier at gaining leverage over lesser players and exploiting them in deals. He points to the ripple effect caused by one little-known clause in the CBA: If a player on a multiyear contract is injured for the last game of a season, 50 percent of the money he’s owed (up to $1 million) the following season becomes guaranteed, even if he can’t play that year or was otherwise not going to make the team.

To avoid that penalty, Fitzgerald says teams are trending toward more one-year deals for bottom-of-the-roster players — another way injury-prone, aging players can find themselves sapped of bargaining power or out of the league.

“They are a monopoly,” says Greisen, who has sold insurance policies against split contracts since the 2015 offseason. “And you’ve only got so many teams and thousands of players: It’s a supply-and-demand problem that goes on, and the teams have all the power.”

Greisen has insured more than 100 NFL players against incentives, including a total in the “mid 50s” specifically for splits. “These guys are going to sign a certain contract, certainly if you only have one offer — but even though you may have three offers, it could be a situation where every team is not willing to [take out] the split.”

When it comes to analyzing team spending, former Oakland Raiders CEO Amy Trask references the old adage: Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity. She doesn’t think the league’s financial inequality is a function of the cap; rather, she believes that some teams just don’t have the cash to give to players, or have banking arrangements that prevent them from spending too much in a given year.

“I think that people who point to the cap as the reason are using the cap as a lazy convenience,” Trask says. “I think there could be different distributions of wealth, there could be a different method of [having an NFL middle class]. But people just say ‘The cap, the cap, the cap.’”

Few inside the sport see real change coming soon. “Teams use every opportunity to cry poverty,” Fitzgerald says. “They’ll use anything and everything in order to say they don’t have the money to pay veterans.” The current contract mechanisms seem firmly entrenched, and agents worry that unless players can find a way to gain leverage where seemingly none exists, the problems will persist and the player class gap will widen.

It’s great to be an NFL player these days — except when it’s not.
 

So Ram

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The Rams had that O'lineman on practice squad ?? Now doesn't that add to another good job of Les Snead adding to the roster.

Sometimes Fisher on his choices of players on game day as well made me shake my head. The offensive line has been a joke since Fisher took over.

I think The Rams will see a world of difference. Why they didn't draft Collins still baffles me. Why they let a player dictate if he would sign a contract.

I was always mad at Al Davis. Here he is taking a team out of LA !! Then making sure Ram games are not played in LA channel 5 in preseason.
The Blackouts is what pissed Ram fans off for years. Sellout games but put up less of a roster.

The thing that made me upset at him though was he could have helped with rookie salary for first round picks.
He signed Jamarcus Russell instead of making him go back into the draft. Why sign a rookie QB without playing in all of training camp & preseason ?? Just real bad choice.
 

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16,608
.

i find it difficult to feel sorry for a player "only" making $700k per season.

they should fell blessed they earn that much money when no team is banging down their door for their services and they spend most of their time standing on the sideline.

.