Andrew Luck poised for monster deal

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CGI_Ram

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http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/a...-luck-the-highest-paid-player-in-nfl-history/

Colts owner Jim Irsay announced a July 4 target date to sign quarterback Andrew Luck to a contract extension during the NFL owners meetings back in March. Luck is scheduled to make $16.155 million for the upcoming season, which is the fifth-year option of his rookie deal.

Irsay gave a slightly amended timetable when talking to the media on April 30, the final day of this year's draft. While acknowledging that progress on a contract was being made, Irsay said he hopes to have a new deal with Luck prior to the start of training camp in late July.

It wouldn't necessarily be a cause for concern if a deal isn't stuck by then. Wide receiver T.Y. Hilton signed an extension last August before the Colts played a preseason game. Offensive tackle Anthony Castonzo's extension came in the days leading up to the 2015 regular-season opener.

Earlier in the offseason, Irsay publicly acknowledged that Luck would get a nine-figure deal with a shocking number. The nine-figure part would surely be a given to Will Wilson, Luck's agent. The shocking number part was probably music to his ears. Below I will detail how I would use a seven-year, $200 million salary proposal to try to ultimately land a four-year contract extension that would make Luck the NFL's first $25 million-per-year player.

The money metrics that matter

Luck has an opportunity to redefine the NFL salary structure where he sets new standards in most major contract metrics if he desires. The current NFL salary standards in key contract metrics are listed below and will have a bearing in his contract negotiations.

  • Average yearly salary: $22,133,333 (Joe Flacco, Baltimore Ravens)
  • Overall contract guarantees: $65 Million (Philip Rivers, San Diego Chargers)
  • Fully guaranteed at signing: $59.955 Million (Ndamukong Suh, Miami Dolphins)
  • Fully guaranteed at signing-QB: $44.5 Million (Aaron Rodgers, Green Bay Packers)
  • Fully guaranteed within 12 months: $59.955 Million (Suh)
  • Fully guaranteed within 12 months-QB: $59 Million (Matt Ryan, Atlanta Falcons)
  • Three-year cash flow: $68.5 Million (Eli Manning, New York Giants)
  • First three new years: $70.6 Million (Russell Wilson, Seattle Seahawks)
Professionals within the industry (agents and team negotiators) typically value deals by new money, which is the amount of compensation in a contact excluding what a player was scheduled to make before receiving a new deal. For example, Flacco had three years remaining on his contract for $58.6 million when he received his new deal in March. Although he signed a six-year contract for $125 million, it's considered a three-year, $66.4 million contract extension with a new-money average of $22,133,333 million per year among industry professionals. Flacco's remaining three contract years for $58.6 million are subtracted from the $125 million six year total to arrive at this number.

Average yearly salary is the most popular contract measure with the general public and is an accepted method to determine the highest-paid player at the various positions and league wide. The lack of security in NFL contracts diminishes the metric's usefulness.

Compensation in the first three years of a deal and the money in the first three new years of a contract are more important measures when assessing contracts. The new-years approach focuses on the amount of money in a contract exclusive of what a player was scheduled to make before receiving a new deal, just like with new money when determining average yearly salary. The cash flow analysis looks at the compensation in its totality. The focus is on the amount of money received in the first three years of a contract regardless of whether it's considered as new money. Both metrics have the same dollar amount when a player signs a new contract as a free agent or when his contract is set to expire.

Overall contract guarantees can be misleading. A complete picture of a contract's true security isn't given by this metric. The amount of money fully guaranteed at signing and will become fully guaranteed early in the contract are the best and most accurate measures of security.

The walk-away figure: $25 million per year

An agent is supposed to take marching orders from the client and attempt to execute his wishes since an agent works for the player. It may sometimes seem as if it's the other way around. In the typical player/agent relationship, a player will give his input about a contract on a big picture level initially during an in-person meeting or phone conversation. The agent will explain his or her game plan to achieve what he or she thinks is an appropriate contract, which will also include the minimally acceptable deal in his or her professional judgment. It's unusual for a player to micromanage a negotiation or give very specific instructions regarding the negotiation process.

After this strategy session, the player's involvement may be limited to just giving feedback on any offers made by the team. Some players prefer only to know when a deal is imminent or won't get involved in the process again until the final stages of a negotiation, if at all. Because of this dynamic, agents are usually given wide latitude to negotiate a contract that they feel is in the client's best interest. There is likely a deeper level of trust in Luck situation's because Wilson is his uncle. The trust factor could result in him being even more deferential than in the typical player/agent relationship.

Part of the agent's calculus should be an assessment of leverage in the negotiations. Leverage favors Luck despite him performing like a marginal starter in 2015 season. When Luck's season ended after Week 9 because of a kidney laceration and abdominal tear, he ranked 31st in completion percentage (55.3 percent) and 32nd in passer rating (74.9 percent). Luck had also thrown the second most interceptions (12) in the NFL.

Luck was the overwhelming choice by NFL team executives as the quarterback to build a franchise around prior to his unimpressive and injury plagued 2015 campaign. Some might choose Cam Newton or Russell Wilson now after their 2015 performances. The expectation is Luck will have a bounce-back year that could rival his 2014 season in which he led the NFL with 40 touchdown passes, was third in passing yards (4,761) and seventh in passer rating (96.5).

The walk-away point from negotiations should be $25 million per year with at least $75 million in guarantees where a minimum of $60 million should be fully guaranteed at signing on a four-year extension. A four-year extension should be preferable because there would be less of a chance of his contract becoming outdated by changing quarterback market conditions. Luck would be entering his contract year in 2020 at 30 years old, which would put him in line for another contract, when he should be approaching the peak years of his career.

Making the most of a stagnant QB market

The top of the quarterback market has remained stagnant since Aaron Rodgers became the NFL's highest paid player in April 2013 with a five-year, $110 million extension. It took nearly three years for Flacco to surpass Rodgers' as the NFL's highest paid player by less than 1 percent in average yearly salary.

High-end quarterback contracts have failed to keep up with the growth in the salary cap. When Rodgers signed his contract, the cap was $123 million. It has grown to $155.27 million this year, which is a 26.23 percent increase, over the three years. The franchise tag, which is an accepted measure for high-end salaries at the respective positions, has increased even more. The quarterback non-exclusive franchise was $14.896 million in 2013. Kirk Cousins' $19.953 million franchise tag with the Washington Redskins is almost 34 percent greater than it was three years ago.

Newton and Wilson are among the NFL's highest-paid players with contracts averaging $20.76 million (includes $60 million in guarantees) and $21.9 million per year (with $61.542 million in guarantees) respectively. The Panthers and Seahawks are fortunate Newton and Wilson signed extensions. Each would have been in a position to easily top the existing standards if they had played out their rookie contracts.

A $25.94 million exclusive franchise tag, which is the average of the top five 2016 quarterback salaries (typically salary cap numbers) when this year's restricted free agent signing period ended on April 22, would have been necessary. The exclusive tag and the types of seasons Newton and Wilson had would have given them leverage for long-term deals in the same neighborhood as Luck's suggested walk-away point of $25 million per year with $75 million in guarantees.

Stagnation hasn't happened with the top of the defensive player market. Mario Williams was the NFL's highest-paid defensive player in 2013 at $16 million per year. The highest-paid defensive player has increased by nearly 20 percent in average yearly salary during this span. Dolphins defensive tackle Ndamukong Suh currently holds the distinction on his six-year, $114.375 million deal averaging $19,062,500 per year. It's conceivable that the margin will increase further this offseason if Denver Broncos franchise player Von Miller signs a long-term deal.

It's an anomaly for Suh to have the most money fully guaranteed at signing and guaranteed within 12 months of signing. Since it has been a quarterback historically, expect a market correction to take place.

Negotiations for Luck's new contract are already underway. My basic strategy to get an acceptable four-year extension would have been to initially offer a much longer deal with total compensation and a contract structure the Colts wouldn't be comfortable with to make the shorter-term deal seem a more much reasonable alternative when eventually proposed as a compromise or concession.

Whether to put the first offer on the table or let the other side go first is a dilemma in many negotiations. It would have been advantageous with a deal of this magnitude to make the first offer to define the starting point of the negotiations and to try to influence the counteroffer made by the Colts.

This first offer would have been a seven-year extension at slightly under $30 million per year ($206 million to $209 million total) with $90 million in player friendly guarantees. Prior to making the offer, conceptual discussions laying its groundwork would have been necessary so the proposal wouldn't create a chilling effect where the Colts would lose motivation to try to reach an agreement or completely shut down negotiations.

A way to accomplish this would have been by analyzing the franchise tag numbers since it's a foregone conclusion that Luck will be given an exclusive franchise tag if a new deal can't be reached before early next March barring a career threatening injury or a significant regression this season. This tag would prevent some quarterback-needy team with an abundance of salary cap room from signing Luck to an offer sheet in 2017 that the Colts might have a difficult time matching since he wouldn't be able to negotiate with other teams.

Preliminarily, the 2017 exclusive quarterback number projects to $23.5 million. A second franchise tag in 2018 would be $28.2 million, a 20 percent increase over Luck's 2017 franchise number. A third franchise tag with a 44 percent increase over the 2018 figure at almost $40.608 million would be unprecedented but its use wouldn't be easily conceded. The average of franchising Luck three straight years would be $92.308 million. This figure would be used as a guide for the overall guarantee and new-money average of the initial proposal.

Another methodology to justify the offer would have been adjusting existing contracts in the stagnant quarterback market by the growth in the non-exclusive quarterback franchise tag since the deals were done. I used a variant of this approach in actual negotiations as an agent when I wasn't satisfied with the actual positional market of a player by using the increase in the salary cap as the growth factor. Franchise tag growth would have been used since it's more favorable to Luck. I found that teams might not totally accept this kind of methodology but wouldn't outright dismiss it either. Partial acceptance was beneficial to the client.

Rodgers, Matt Ryan and Drew Brees have the best adjusted contracts, which are in the chart below.

Name Year Signed Growth Factor Guaranteed Money New Average Adjusted Guaranteed Money Adjusted New Average Contract Length
Rodgers 2013 33.95% $54M $22M $72,332,304 $29,468,716 5 Year Extension
Ryan 2013 33.95% $59M $20.75M $79,029,740 $27,794,358 5 Year Extension
Brees 2012 38.21% $60.5M $20M $83,621,259 $27,643,392 5 Years
Average $78,328,434 $28,302,155 5 Years

How Peyton Manning factors into the Luck negotiations

The Colts' treatment of Peyton Manning, the first overall pick in the 1998 draft should be particularly relevant in Luck's negotiations since the two are inextricably linked in the team's history. The decision to use the first overall pick in 2012 on Luck after Manning missed the entire 2011 season with a career threatening neck injury was responsible for him spending the last four years of his career with the Broncos. Luck compares favorably to Manning during the first four NFL seasons as illustrated in the chart below.

Player Years Games Comp. Attempts Pct. Yards TDs INT Rating Record Playoff Wins
Luck 2012-2015 55 1224 2106 58.1% 14838 101 55 85 35-20 3
Manning 1998-2001 64 1357 2226 61.0% 16418 111 81 85.1 32-32 0

Manning also had a challenging fourth season, although not to the same degree as Luck. The Colts went 6-10, which got Jim Mora fired while Manning's 23 interceptions were the second most in the NFL. Unlike Luck, Manning didn't win his first playoff game until his sixth season in 2003.

The Colts made Manning the NFL's highest-paid player in 2004 at $14 million per year after his six-year rookie contract expired when the cap was $80.582 million. The cap has gone up almost 93 percent since then. This deal averages almost $27 million per year in today's $155.27 million cap environment. Using the non-exclusive franchise tags as a growth factor doesn't make sense in this instance because a different method of calculation was used prior to the current Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Manning also essentially got a one-year deal for $26.4 million with a bad neck in 2011 because the Colts released him in 2012 from his extremely front-loaded five-year, $90 million contract. There was $70.2 million in the first three years of his Broncos deal. These facts also shouldn't be ignored.

luck-1400.jpg

Andrew Luck could be the NFL's first $25 million man. USATSI
Final thoughts on making Luck a $25 million man

Luck seemed well on his way to changing the NFL salary landscape with his next contract where he would become the NFL's first $25 million per year player while setting the standard in most key contract metrics prior to his dismal 2015 season. It's still a realistic possibility provided that Luck uses his leverage. The Colts don't have any legitimate alternatives because nearly every potential franchise quarterback is signed long term or under a rookie contract.

The Colts will be paying Luck for what they expect him to become. The expectations for Luck haven't changed because of his 2015 performance: Be an elite quarterback who consistently puts the Colts in Super Bowlcontention.

It would be a surprise if Luck and the Colts don't reach an agreement prior to the start of the regular season. If the Colts have reservations about making the necessary salary commitment to Luck this offseason, it will be in his best interest to bet on rebounding this season and forcing Irsay to pay him a truly shocking number next offseason rather than sell himself short contractually now.
 

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Plays in a weak division. 58.1 completion pct. In contrast, Case Keenum had a 60.4 completion pct. Last season: 15 td's, 12 int's, 1,881 yards. Yet he'll end up signing a huge contract. Before someone says "Yeah, but would love to have him play for the Rams," I wonder how he'd do in the rugged NFC West?
 

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TLDR. Luck has proven to be a good NFL QB and nothing more.... Thus far. I find him a bit overhyped.
 

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Nick Foles also had one monster year. Luck is young, and has great potential but is at the moment overrated, imo.
 

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Plays in a weak division. 58.1 completion pct. In contrast, Case Keenum had a 60.4 completion pct. Last season: 15 td's, 12 int's, 1,881 yards. Yet he'll end up signing a huge contract. Before someone says "Yeah, but would love to have him play for the Rams," I wonder how he'd do in the rugged NFC West?
He wouldn't make much noise in this division, IMO.
He's 17-2 against the AFC South.
18-18 against everyone else - including 2-2 against the NFCW.
 

OntarioRam

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Luck is a very good QB. I'm not sure if I'd say great... but I don't watch enough of him to say for sure. I will say that I definitely do not consider him to be among the very best at his position. Apparently, the Colts disagree based on the dollar figures being thrown around. If Luck gets the pay day this author thinks he is in for I don't think it will be long before Colts fan turn on him as being "overpaid".
 

RamWoodie

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I think Luck is the real deal. I don't think he's overhyped as much as I think the Colts didn't protect their investment very well. Luck was one of the most battered QB in the league in 2014...and in 2015 I think he tried to do too much!

I equally think Luck has wised up for his long term future. I expect this year to be really good for him...but we'll see.
 

yrba1

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Ehhh, wish he'd go to a different team. I'm starting to dislike the Colts because of Irsay and Grigson. Luck, playing in the AFC South, and Irsay's ego is the only reason Grigson has a job right now.
 

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I think Luck may test the market or at least act like he is going to. He'd be silly not to IMO.
 

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Possibly yes, that's an alternative I had forgotten about.

I think more free agents will be hitting the market after the rookie contract ends and I was already on record a couple of years agoi saying that Luck may be the first guy to get a 30MIL per year deal.

If he hit free agency of course.
 

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http://mmqb.si.com/mmqb/2016/05/25/nfl-andrew-luck-indianapolis-colts

The Trouble with Andrew Luck (It’s Not His Fault)
The Colts’ QB has all the talent to recapture his old magic, but he needs the right pieces around him—and a better system, too
by Andy Benoit

andrew-luck-beard-shot.png

Justin K. Aller/Getty Images

Let’s get one thing straight: Andrew Luck is still a top-echelon quarterback. For his first three seasons he was as good as any in the NFL. And at 26, he’s capable of not just recapturing that magic but building on it. He has the intelligence of a young Peyton Manning, the throwing prowess of Carson Palmer, the strength and mobility of Cam Newton, and the playmaking knack of Ben Roethlisberger.

But what’s also true: Luck is coming off a horrendous 2015 season. He got hurt, often threw inaccurately and made enough bad decisions to register 13 turnovers in just seven starts (and it could have been worse).

So how can the Colts get their quarterback on track again? Luck would probably take umbrage at the premise and assert that he has to get himself back on track by playing better. He does, but it’s not so simple.

Before exploring how to get back on track, we must first understand what put Luck and the Colts off track.

Start with a bad offensive line—one that was iffy on the edges and outright deplorable inside. The line couldn’t move bodies in the ground game, which made the Colts too pass-oriented. From there the line struggled in protection, particularly against twists, stunts and gap-exchange blitzes—really anything where defenders crisscrossed in some fashion to make blockers adjust laterally.

That’s a major problem for young linemen who lack athleticism and have not honed the peripheral vision that comes with experience. Worse yet, many defenses directed their pass rush inside, attacking Indy’s weak line at its weakest spot. This created pressure right up the middle, which no quarterback can survive.

The Colts’ Week 9 game against the Broncos was the low point. It was a game they actually won, but the Broncos, with their dynamic pass rushers and creative twists and stunts, hit Luck 11 times, most of them square body blows. Somewhere in there, he suffered a lacerated kidney and abdominal damage. He didn’t play again in 2015.

andrew-luck-650-433-mmqb-colts-broncos.png

Photo: Joe Robbins/Getty Images

The Denver game also offered a snapshot of what exacerbated Indy’s protection woes: Colts wide receivers could not shake the fervid press coverage of cornerbacks Chris Harris, Aqib Talib and Bradley Roby. This included T.Y. Hilton, whose electrifying wheels tend to spin in place when he’s not afforded a clean release off the line. (This, by the way, is why Hilton is not quite a true No. 1 receiver, regardless of what statistics might say.)

The worst scheme you can employ when you have receivers who struggle against the jam and offensive linemen who don’t move well is one that features five- and seven-step dropbacks. That’s often the scheme the Colts employed. Their reasoning was likely two-fold. One: Luck is tremendous late in the down, especially from the pocket. Two: the Colts aspired to have a power running game. Deep-drop passing attacks often correlate well with power running games because such dropbacks usually have an extra tight end or back in to help block, and so they occur out of heavier, run-oriented formations.

Colts GM Ryan Grigson has taken some steps to improve the talent around Luck. He spent a first-round pick on Alabama center Ryan Kelly and a third-rounder on Texas Tech’s Le’Raven Clark, who can play guard or tackle. Good steps in what appear to be the right direction, but there are more to take. Plus, while Indy’s receiving corps (Hilton, Donte Moncrief and Phillip Dorsett) is dangerously fast, physical press coverage issues remain.

If Hilton could consistently shake press he would have learned to by now. Dorsett’s lissome body structure isn’t ideal for shedding jams. Moncrief might have hope; it depends on if he can augment what so far is a solid foundation of technical mechanics. Nevertheless, we’re talking about a group that overall must be helped schematically through intertwined route combinations, presnap motion and condensed formations—tactics that force press corners to back off.

Factor this in with a suspect O-line that’s not yet fully remade and it’s apparent that Indy’s system needs to change. Luck might be great late in the down, but that’s also when most turnovers and injuries occur. You can’t play late in the down with limited blockers and overpowered receivers; the longer a down goes, the likelier it is those guys will be exploited.

Luck has already said he needs to do a better job protecting himself. That’s a nice sentiment, and undoubtedly he’s working hard this offseason to enact it. But guys with Luck’s sort of ability never actually play with self-preserving discipline in the heat of battle. Besides, if it’s a deep-drop passing game, Luck will be forced to go late in the down anyway.

andrew-luck-colts-panthers-rain.png

Photo: Grant Halverson/Getty Images

Two prime examples of quarterbacks once in Luck’s shoes are Jay Cutler and Ben Roethlisberger. As a pure thrower, Cutler is as talented as anyone in football. Often, this has led to him taking ill-conceived risks and unnecessary hits. But last year, Adam Gase, in his one and only year as Chicago’s offensive coordinator, figured out how to change this. Gase believed that Cutler’s problems came against four-man rushes, not blitzes.

When the four-man rush didn’t get home, Cutler would hold the ball, the play would eventually lose structure and then anything—good or bad, but too often bad—could happen from there. So, Gase essentially forced Cutler to treat every play like a blitz by having him get the ball out on a three-step dropback. In other words, Gase’s system implemented the disciplined, prompt decision-making that Cutler’s raw talents always prevented him from adopting.

The same thing happened with Roethlisberger. When Todd Haley took over as Pittsburgh’s offensive coordinator, in 2012, he installed more spread sets and quick-strike throws. At first, the growing pains were distressing. But now Roethlisberger is one of the sharpest timing passers in the league. He’s taken fewer hits and is a better player in his mid-30s than he was in his mid- and late-20s (something nobody familiar with Ben’s bruising style would have everpredicted).

Through all of this, Cutler and Roethlisberger have not lost their playmaking prowess. Cutler made a handful of remarkable late fourth quarter touchdowns to win games last season. For Pittsburgh, Antonio Brown is the most productive receiver in the league in large part because Roethlisberger still channels his Big Ben when needed.

Every game presents a few critical third-and-long situations. Wins and losses are often determined by what happens here. The key is to not encounter too many third-and-longs offensively. That’s the idea of the quick-strike passing game.

We hear all the time that the NFL is a pass-happy league. It is, but probably not in the way most people imagine. The increase in passes hasn’t been in the form of 18-yard dig routes or 25-yard post patterns; they’re six-yard slants, four-yard flat routes and wide receiver screens. They’re really just new-age extensions of the running game.

Which is why, despite the NFL being a pass-happy league, every coach still emphasizes the importance of play-calling balance. You can call five passes in a row and still be balanced as long as three or four of those passes are at the short and shallow-intermediate levels.

New Colts offensive coordinator Rob Chudzinski must construct a system along these lines. That’s easier said than done. The Colts have the requisite quick, darting receivers for this, but they’re not very flexible at running back or tight end. Frank Gore and Robert Turbin are traditional ballcarriers, and the only proven tight end, Dwayne Allen, is more of an H-back than a downfield pass catcher. Allen’s flexibility is in the form of presnap motion, misdirection blocking and maybe the occasional route from the slot.

Contrast this with the offense Cutler had last year, which featured versatile tight end Martellus Bennett and even more versatile running back Matt Forte. Or Roethlisberger’s offense, which had receiving back dynamo Le’Veon Bell. After Bell’s knee injury, the Steelers were left with the more conventional DeAngelo Williams, who played with tight end Heath Miller (also very conventional).

But by that point, they had been practicing the flex formations with Bell for so many years that the backups were prepared to keep that system afloat. (Granted, having Antonio Brown and Martavis Bryant helped.)

Maybe this is Chudzinski’s saving grace. With a fast receiving corps and smart QB, you can, with enough dedication and practice, build a quick-strike aerial assault even if your backs and tight ends are better suited for a more traditional offense. The other factor that’s easy to overlook is having a smart QB.

In order to get the ball out quickly, a quarterback must diagnose the coverage and anticipate disguises before the snap. If he can’t, he’ll need extra time after the snap to read the field and make a decision. That’s extra time the play design doesn’t allow for.

Luck has more than ample football intelligence to become a commandeering ball-out-quickly QB. The beauty is that it’s not a binary equation. Progression in the presnap phase does not mean regression in the postsnap phase. At any time Luck can still do the playmaking that makes him special. That is, if he’s not being asked to do it all the time.